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Abstract The calls for NGO accountability have grown louder in recent years,
some based on genuine concerns to help improve their performance and others on a
desire to muffle their advocacy activities. Using a comprehensive analytical
framework, this article finds that current accountability approaches prioritize
accountability to boards and donors and give weak accountability to communities
despite strong NGO rhetoric to the contrary. The article recommends the devel-
opment of accountability mechanisms managed by NGO coordination bodies and
focused primarily on accountability to communities to improve NGO performance
and protect them from politically motivated attacks.
Re´sume´ Les appels a` la responsabilite´ des ONG se sont faits plus pressants ces
dernie`res anne´es. Certains s’appuient sur une volonte´ authentique de les aider a`
ame´liorer leur efficacite´, et d’autres sur le de´sir d’e´touffer leurs activite´s de soutien.
A` travers une de´marche analytique comple`te, cet article de´montre que les approches
actuelles privile´gient la responsabilite´ des ONG face aux commissions et aux
donateurs et leur attribuent une faible responsabilite´ devant les communaute´s, en
de´pit des de´mentis formels des ONG. Cet article recommande le de´veloppement de
me´canismes de responsabilite´ ge´re´s par les organismes de coordination des ONG et
principalement axe´s sur la responsabilite´ face aux communaute´s, afin d’ame´liorer
l’efficacite´ des ONG et de les prote´ger des attaques a` vise´e politique.
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Zusammenfassung Die Forderungen nach einer Rechenschaftspflicht nicht-
staatlicher Organisationen haben in den letzten Jahren zugenommen, wobei einige auf
dem aufrichtigen Anliegen beruhen, zu ihrer Leistungsverbesserung beizutragen,
wa¨hrend andere durch den Wunsch geleitet werden, ihre Lobbyaktivita¨ten
einzuschra¨nken. Mit Hilfe eines umfassenden analytischen Systems kommt dieser
Beitrag zu dem Ergebnis, dass die gegenwa¨rtigen Ansa¨tze die Rechenschaftspflicht
gegenu¨ber Vorsta¨nden und Spendern prioritisieren und eine nur geringe
Rechenschaftspflicht gegenu¨ber den Gemeinschaften vorsehen, auch wenn die nicht-
staatlichen Organisationen mit starker Rhetorik dagegenhalten. Der Beitrag empfiehlt
die Entwicklung von Rechenschaftsmechanismen, die von den Koordinierungs-
gremien der nichtstaatlichen Organisationen verwaltet werden und sich vornehmlich
auf die Rechenschaftspflicht gegenu¨ber den Gemeinschaften konzentrieren, um so die
Leistung der nicht-staatlichen Organisationen zu verbessern und sie vor politisch
motivierten U¨bergriffen zu schu¨tzen,
Resumen En los u´ltimos an˜os cada vez son ma´s las voces que reclaman a las
ONG la presentacio´n de sus cuentas, algunas basadas en aute´nticas preocupaciones
por ayudar a mejorar sus resultados y otras desde el deseo de amortiguar sus
actividades de defensa. Utilizando un marco analı´tico exhaustivo, este artı´culo
revela que los actuales enfoques de rendicio´n de cuentas dan prioridad a los con-
sejos y los donantes, y ofrecen escasos informes a las comunidades pese a que las
ONG se esfuerzan en asegurar lo contrario. En este artı´culo se recomienda de-
sarrollar los mecanismos de rendimiento de cuentas gestionados por los organismos
de coordinacio´n de las ONG y centrados ba´sicamente en la presentacio´n de esas
cuentas a las comunidades con el fin de mejorar los resultados de las ONG y
protegerlas de ataques con motivaciones polı´ticas.
Keywords NGO accountability  Community participation  Program evaluation 
Organizational performance management  Organizational learning
Introduction
The success of NGOs over the last two decades in helping improve the lives of
marginalized communities in developing countries through program and advocacy
work is well recognized. However, the vocal advocacy of NGOs against
governments, multilateral institutions, militant groups, and other stakeholders has
also led to a strong backlash against them (Brown and Moore 2001). The backlash
has consisted of cut-backs in funding; strict host government legislation; restrictions
on operations; questioning of NGO performance, legitimacy and representativeness;
physical attacks and calls for stronger NGO accountability (Jordan and Tuijl 2006;
Naidoo 2004).
Many of the calls for greater NGO accountability genuinely aim to help them
improve their performance based on evidence that actual NGO performance may
not be as good as assumed. However, the calls from certain stakeholders are aimed
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mainly at muting NGO criticisms of their policies (Edwards 2006). The latter calls
generally focus on upward accountability to donors and host governments and have
the potential to distract attention from the importance that NGOs place on being
accountable to communities (Fox and Brown 1998). Thus, more effective NGO
accountability mechanisms will help both in enhancing their performance and
protecting them from politically motivated attacks.
The main purpose of this article is to undertake an analysis of the main strengths
and weaknesses of the current approaches to NGO accountability, especially with
respect to the degree to which they emphasize accountability to communities and
suggest ways for strengthening them. This analysis reveals that the accountability of
NGOs is currently strongest to boards and donors and weakest to peer groups and
communities. It also reveals that NGOs can best achieve the twin objectives of
enhancing their own performance and protecting themselves from politically
motivated attacks by voluntarily developing coordinated, peer-driven, and commu-
nity-focused accountability mechanisms. The next section presents an analytical
framework, developed through a thorough literature review, to understand and
unpack the concept of NGO accountability. With the help of this framework, the
third section analyzes the nature of accountability over NGOs that current
approaches currently in use give different stakeholders. The final section provides
recommendations for enhancing NGO accountability to communities. The ideas
presented here are relevant for both international NGOs (those working in more than
one developing country) and national NGOs.
Accountability of NGOs: An Analytical Framework
The calls for NGO accountability have grown louder recently due to several
reasons. First, some stakeholders targeted by NGO advocacy have reciprocated by
criticizing NGOs to undermine their credibility and advocacy activities. A key
question being increasingly asked is ‘‘who do NGOs represent’’ as a way to
undermining their legitimacy and weakening their ability to influence policies
nationally and internationally. NGOs are criticized for having too much influence
compared to their degree of representativeness and contribution (Naidoo 2004).
Second, the explosive growth of NGOs has also made it easier for groups with
ulterior motives to set up NGOs as fund-raising covers. For example, many militant
groups have set up NGOs to collect funds for terrorist activities. This has led to the
closer scrutiny of all NGOs in the wake of the 9/11 (McGann and Johnstone 2006;
Bendell 2006). Many host governments and militants groups also perceive NGOs as
working closely with the intelligence agencies of western countries while the former
also view them as competitors for funding from western donors (Unerman and
O’Dwyer 2006; Mayhew 2005).
Third, there have also been several high profile cases of abuse of power and
resources involving even well-established NGOs, e.g., the client sexual abuse
scandal in West Africa in the late 1990s (Jordan 2005, 2007; Bendell 2006). Fourth,
several in-depth comparative evaluations of NGO projects have also raised
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questions about the quality of NGO projects (Riddell et al. 1997; Oakley 1999).
These trends have reduced the trust surplus that NGO had enjoyed earlier. The
growing realization that their good intentions alone may not necessarily translate
into good results has led to increasing pressure on NGOs to provide evidence that
they are performing well and using their funds transparently (Vibert 2007).
Thus, there are several advantages that can accrue to NGOs from voluntarily
undertaking more effective accountability activities despite the extra costs. More
effective accountability will enhance incentives for improved performance,
encourage NGOs to become more closely aligned with community perspectives,
and enhance shared learning about good practices and programs (Wenar 2006). It
will provide greater assurance to donors and supporters, and help expand their
support. It will also help achieve the morality and transparency considerations that
NGOs strongly subscribe to by increasing their credibility and influence, and
enhancing their ability to influence larger stakeholders to become more accountable
(Sawarung 2003). By initiating more effective accountability mechanisms, NGOs
can avoid the imposition of inappropriate and top-down accountability mechanisms
by external stakeholders and protect themselves from politically motivated attacks
(Wenar 2006; Unerman and O’Dwyer 2006).
Despite these benefits, the importance attached to accountability by NGOs varies
significantly. In a study of over 600 NGOs globally, Scholte (2003) found that
despite their emphasis on it in principle, most NGOs had given little practical
attention to the issue. Accountability processes were seen as being too expensive
and time-consuming, and adding little value to their work. Respondents felt that
since the power of NGOs was limited compared to other agencies, their own
accountability was not a serious issue. However, this argument misses the point that
the accountability of agencies that advocate for the accountability of others is
dictated primarily not by their size of contribution but by the strength of their
advocacy. Calls for greater NGO accountability were also viewed with suspicion
given the questionable motivation of many lobbyists and governments to use them
as means for regulating NGOs. While these concerns do not reduce the rationale for
NGO accountability, they do highlight the importance of ensuring that any new
mechanism strengthens accountability to communities, does not impose exorbitant
costs, provides real benefits in improving operations and avoids giving excessive
authority to stakeholders with an ‘‘ax to grind’’ against NGOs. The following
discussion aims to contribute to the achievement of these objectives by unpacking
the concept of accountability (see Fig. 1).
In analyzing NGO accountability processes, the basic questions are: what does
accountability really mean and what is its purpose? The literal meaning of
accountability is the ability to take account from someone. Drawing upon the ideas
provided by Schedler (1999) and Goetz and Jenkins (2002), this article defines
accountability as the right to be involved in all phases and levels of the performance
management cycle of an entity. This definition reflects the fact that beyond formal
supervising individuals or entities, other stakeholders may also have the right to
participate in the performance management process of an entity for a variety of
purposes. The purpose of accountability is often viewed narrowly as identifying and
punishing poor performance in light of stated goals only. However, the purposes of
112 Voluntas (2012) 23:109–125
123
accountability also include adjusting stated goals in line with a fluid environment,
proactively avoiding poor performance, converting acceptable performance into
excellence, enhancing shared learning among different stakeholders and most
importantly, improving justice in access to power and resources (Adapted from Lee
2004).
Lee (2004) also identifies the following key questions to help develop NGO
accountability frameworks: (1) To whom is the NGO accountable (to this, we add
the question of ‘‘why’’)? (2) What is the NGO accountable for? (3) How is the NGO
accountable? Grant and Keohane (2005) identify two sets of entities which are
entitled to hold someone else to account: (1) those entities that have delegated
authority or resources to another entity, and (2) those entities that are exposed to the
effects of the actions of another entity. These two categories lead to several different
types of accountability (Dwivedi and Jabbra 1988): (1) administrative (based on
managerial oversight), (2) legal (based on contractual relationships and judicial
authority), (3) moral (based on ethical values voluntarily accepted by an entity), (4)
political (based on constituent relationships), and (5) professional (based on peer
relationships with other similar professionals). To this can be added a sixth type of
accountability that is based on the capacity of clients to withhold business, i.e.,
market accountability. The legal and administrative types lead to the strongest
accountability relationships, the market and political basis lead to medium strength
accountability relationships and professional and moral basis generally lead to
relatively weak accountability relationships, as we discuss below.
Based on these concepts, a wide variety of stakeholders can claim accountability
over NGOs, each one of them having very divergent aims in holding NGOs to
account (Lloyd and de las Casas 2006; Brown and Jagananda 2007). International
Accountability Definition1: The right to be involved in all phases and levels of the performance management cycle of an entity
Purposes3: Correct problems Avoid future problems Facilitate excellence Adjust standards Enhance shared learning Enhance justice
TO WHOM/WHY?3 Upward6 Inward6 Sideward6 ‘Downward’6
Stakeholders2 Donors Home/Host Govts. Board NGO bodies Staff/partners/communities
Justification4 Delegation Delegation Delegation Exposure (Medium) Exposure (High)
Basis5 Legal Legal Administrative Professional Legal/Moral
Strength (high, medium or low) of accountability depends on
Span of involvement2 Frequency of 
involvement2





All aspects; Significant 
aspects; Limited aspects 
Usually, frequently, 
occasionally
Manages decision process, 
participates in decision 
process, consulted
Legally required; required 
by agency’s policies; 
informally invited
Sole authority; one 
among few; one 
among many
Self-exposure; 
collects own info; 
depends on NGO info
FOR WHAT3? HOW2, 3?
















SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE STANDARDS2 SPECIFIC DATA COLLECTION TOOLS2
Process-related Impact-related Financial reports Progress reports
Efficiency Effectiveness Field observations Physical measures
Technical standards Community involvement Staff/partner feedback Community feedback 
Financial integrity/legality Sustainability Internal documents and 
systems review
Community cases, photos, 
and videosCoordination Equity 
1. Adapted from Schedler (1999) and Goetz and Jenkins (2002); 2. Proposed by the current author; 3. Adapted from Lee (2004); 4.  Grant and Keohane (2005); 5. Dwivedi, and 
Jabbra, (1988); 6. Adapted from Brown and Jagadananda (2007); 7. Adapted from Kilby, 2006); 8. Adapted from Cavill and Sohail (2007), Ebrahim (2003) and Edwards and 
Hulme (1995); 9. Adapted from Grant and Keohane (2005).
Fig. 1 NGO accountability—an analytical framework
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NGOs experience accountability in all four directions or 360 accountability—
upward accountability to donors and home and host governments (legal basis with
governments controlling the terms and conditions), inward accountability to their
boards (administrative basis), ‘‘downward’’ accountability to communities (moral
and in rare cases political and market basis), staff and partners (legal basis but with
NGO controlling the terms and conditions), and sideward accountability to NGO
bodies (professional basis). In addition, NGOs also have rather diffuse accounta-
bility to the general public (moral basis). The directional schema for accountability
described above is commonly used by NGOs. Ironically, it aptly describes the
hierarchical manner in which the various stakeholders are linked to NGOs in reality,
with donors and governments above NGOs and communities, staff and partners
below NGOs in the power hierarchy.
The strength of the accountability of these stakeholders varies significantly based
on a variety of factors (Wapner 2002). First, the strength depends on the entity’s
span of involvement in the accountability process at a given level (see below for a
description of the levels), which can range from all aspects, significant aspects and
limited aspects (high, medium, and low span, respectively). For example, some
entities may have the authority to set global standards in the area of human
resources only (such as government labor relations departments) while another
entity may have the ability to set global standards in all program and program
support functions (such as the agency board). Second, the strength depends on how
often an entity participates in NGO accountability, i.e., usually, frequently or
occasionally (high, medium, and low frequency, respectively). Third, it depends on
the degree of influence an entity has in NGO accountability processes, which can
range from deciding alone/managing the decision-making process to participating in
the decision-making process to being consulted during the decision-making process
(high, medium, and low influence, respectively).
Fourth, the strength also depends on the level of formality of involvement
(adapted from Kilby 2006), i.e., whether the participation of the entity is: (1) legally
required, (2) administratively required by the accountable agency’s board-mandated
policies, or (3) at the informal discretion of the accountable agency’s staff (high,
medium, and low formality, respectively). Fifth, it depends on the level of
concentration of authority in an entity. For example, boards and home governments
are the sole authorities of their type for any NGO (high concentration). A donor,
NGO body or host government is one among a limited number of its type and has
significant capacity to coordinate with others of its type (medium concentration).
Finally, a given community is usually one among a large number of communities
that an NGO works with and has limited capacities to coordinate with other
communities (low concentration). Finally, the strength depends on the level of
scrutiny that an entity exercises over an NGO, which varies from self-exposure
(high scrutiny as in the case of communities) to usually collecting independent data
about the NGO’s performance (medium scrutiny) to usually relying on the
information provided by the NGO or external auditors and evaluators hired by NGO
staff members (low scrutiny).
The next question in the accountability of NGOs is ‘‘what is the accountability
for?’’ The definition provided earlier helps in identifying three distinct phases of
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accountability, i.e., standards setting, performance appraisal and sanctioning, that an
account-holder must participate into exercise effective accountability (Wenar 2006;
Grant and Keohane 2005). However, in reality, account-holders, especially those in
the case of NGOs, seldom possess a high degree of control in all of these phases
(Charnovitz 2005). Another related aspect is the level of accountability. The two
main levels of NGO accountability include functional/practical accountability
(which refers to accountability for specific activities and projects) and strategic
accountability (which focuses on accountability related to an agency’s overall
mission, goals, and policies) (adapted from Cavill and Sohail 2007; Ebrahim 2003b;
Edwards and Hulme 1995). The final dimension of what an NGO is accountable for
relates to the specific performance standards for NGOs, which consist of two types.
The first type is impact oriented criteria: (1) involvement of communities, (2)
effectiveness (e.g., high impact, timeliness, relevance, and convenience), (3) equity
(for gender and other marginal groups), and (4) sustainability (environmental,
financial, managerial, and political). The second type is process-oriented criteria: (5)
technical standards, (6) financial integrity/legality, (7) efficiency (cost-benefit ratio),
and (8) coordination with others.
The final question relates to how accountability is carried out. There is usually a
tendency to equate ‘‘how’’ with the merits of specific data collection tools, such as
participatory appraisal and social audits. However, the more important aspect of
‘‘how’’ from our point of view is the nature of the overall processes currently in use
for undertaking accountability, which include: (1) board-managed global strategy
planning and review, (2) NGO body accreditation/certification programs and codes
of conduct, (3) home government registration and review, (4) donor-managed
project approval, evaluation and audit, (5) host government NGO legislation and
project approval, evaluation, and audit, and (6) NGO staff managed project cycle
activities. The specific tools mainly used to collect data in these processes include:
(1) financial data and reports, (2) narrative progress reports, (3) field observations,
(4) physical measures, (5) staff/partner feedback through interviews and meetings,
(6) community feedback through meetings, interviews and participatory exercises
such as participatory rural appraisals or social audits, (7) internal documents and
systems review, and (8) community stories, photos, and videos.
Thus, in light of the various criteria outlined above, the strongest accountability
over NGOs will be exercised by an entity which participates at the strategic and
functional levels in all three phases of NGO accountability with high frequency,
span, influence, formality, scrutiny, and concentration of authority and is able to
employ a wide range of performance criteria and data collection tools.
An Overview of Current NGO Accountability Practices
A number of approaches have been developed by different stakeholders for
undertaking NGO accountability. These approaches include certification systems,
rating systems, infrastructure and management capacity tools, self-regulation, codes
of conduct, and monitoring and evaluation tools (Lee 2004). In addition to the lack
of consensus on the merits of these approaches, they suffer from the following
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shortcomings (Jordan 2005): (1) give higher priority to accountability to donors and
governments rather than communities, (2) are controlling rather than collaborative,
(3) are disconnected from the reality and the context in which NGOs work, (4)
include un-measurable or unrealistic goals, and (5) place heavy cost and time
burden. This section analyzes these diverse processes, especially the extent to which
they facilitate accountability to communities using the framework developed in the
last section (see Table 1 for a summary).
Processes for Strategic-Level NGO Accountability
Board-Led Accountability Processes
The main NGO accountability process employed by boards is the board-led strategy
development process, which generally sets out the overall mission, goals and plans
of the agency, and its periodic reviews during which goals and plans are adjusted
and action taken against the agency’s senior management if performance falls
significantly short of standards (Cornforth 2003). Boards generally rely on the
information provided by NGO staff members and external auditors and evaluators
hired by staff members and occasionally undertake field visits. Even so, an analysis
in light of the evaluation framework criteria reveals that the strength of
accountability that boards possess over NGOs is high as they participate in all
three phases of NGO strategic accountability with high frequency, influence, span,
and concentration of authority, medium formality, and low level of scrutiny.
For most agencies, the level of community participation in strategy development
and review processes is limited and is usually at the discretion of international or
field staff (low formality). Very few agencies, such as ActionAid, Oxfam and Save
the Children, mandate such consultation as part of their board-approved account-
ability policies (medium formality). However, even in the case of these NGOs,
communities are only consulted (low influence) about the standards and subsequent
performance and are usually not involved in the sanctioning phase in case
performance is not satisfactory (Wenar 2006). As its ultimate custodian, the main
motivation for the board in agency accountability is safeguarding its reputation. The
quality of services to communities is an important though not the only factor
contributing to agency reputation (quality of marketing efforts is perhaps a more
important contributing factor). Given the isolated nature of most NGO communities,
the quality of program services must reach extremely low levels before there is a
serious danger to agency reputation. Thus, the main incentive for the board is
avoiding very poor program quality rather than converting ordinary performance
into excellence.
Home Government NGO Accountability Processes
International NGOs face an additional process of accountability—the one managed
by the home countries in which they are registered. The main NGO accountability
process employed by home government NGO regulation authorities, such as the
Charity Commission of England and Wales, is the NGO registration and subsequent
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reporting mechanism. The Charity Commission of England and Wales has the
authority to cancel the registration in case of wrong-doing by any NGO. The main
motivation for it in NGO accountability is the protection of public funds collected
by NGOs. Hence, the focus of its processes is mainly on financial and legal matters
and they rarely look at the quality of operations and the extent of community
participation (Charity Commission 2010). Since the bulk of the activities of INGOs
are overseas, such departments generally have limited capacities to scrutinize NGO
performance closely. Thus, viewed from the perspective of the evaluation
framework criteria, home countries possess medium strength accountability over
NGOs as they participate in all three phases of the accountability of NGOs at the
strategic level with high frequency, influence, formality, and concentration of
authority, and low span and level of scrutiny.
NGO-Body Managed Accreditation Mechanisms
The main NGO accountability process managed by NGO coordination or watchdog
bodies are self-regulated accreditation mechanisms (Naidoo 2004). The main such
mechanisms at the international level are: (1) the Red Cross NGO Codes of Conduct
for emergencies, (2) the Sphere principles, (3) the Interaction self-regulation
mechanism, (4) the One World Trust Global Accountability Project, (5) the ALNAP
mechanism, (6) the Humanitarian Accountability Partnership, (7) the NGO
Accountability Charter, and (8) the People in Aid mechanism. While the voluntary
nature of NGO participation in these mechanisms limits their influence on NGO
practices, reputational factors do encourage NGOs to enroll in these mechanisms,
especially since many donors (e.g., the Australian government) consider participa-
tion in such mechanisms as one criterion in funding NGOs and approving tax-
exempt status. However, even if NGOs do enroll in them, most of them depend on
self-reporting and very few mechanisms (e.g., the Philippine Council for NGO
Certification) require third party assessment as a condition for certification. In a
review of 35 such mechanisms, it was found that most such mechanisms focused on
setting global industry standards for internal governance administration and
financial management systems and the emphasis on community participation was
generally weak (Lloyd and de las Casas 2006). Thus, even the most potent of these
mechanisms possess medium strength accountability as they conduct accountability
processes in all three phases at the strategic level with high influence (decide about
giving accreditation), medium frequency (depending on the percentage of NGOs in
a country enrolled in a particular mechanism), concentration authority and span and
low formality and scrutiny capacity.
Processes for Functional-Level NGO Accountability
Donor-Led NGO Accountability Process
By pursuing funding from donors, NGOs make themselves accountable to donors for
all three phases of accountability at the functional level (for particular projects and
activities). First, they have to make sure that the goals for the project are in line with
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donor funding priorities. Second, based on contractual obligations, the donors also
have the legal right to measure performance at the end of the project. Finally, at the
sanctioning phase, the donor has the authority not only to refuse future funding if it is
not satisfied with performance but also to ask for the money back on the current project
if the money has not been used according to the terms and conditions of the contract.
The main tools employed by donors for NGO accountability are the proposal approval
and project evaluation processes. A few donors (e.g., the Swedish government) also
have formal accreditation processes before NGO become eligible to submit proposals
to them. Very few donors manage the evaluation and audit process themselves or
through external evaluators and auditors appointed by them (e.g., the USAID appoints
its own auditors for large projects). Their assessment is generally based on the
progress, financial, and audit reports submitted by the NGO, supplemented in some
cases by field visits by donor staff members (ACCA 2009). Thus, the level of scrutiny
experienced by the NGO during the performance evaluation phase varies significantly.
However, overall, the strength of donor accountability over NGOs is high as
donors participate in NGO accountability process in all three phases at the
functional level with high frequency, influence, span and formality and medium
scrutiny capacity and concentration of authority. The overall span of a donor at the
total functional level of an agency depends on the percentage of the agency’s global
project funds that come from it. This could be very high if an agency is primarily
dependent on one donor, such as in the case of many large American NGOs and US
government funding. In such cases, the sum of the functional accountability of the
donor across all projects may translate into high strategic accountability for
the donor over the NGO, since the NGO may be forced to close down globally if the
donor stops funding it. On the other hand, many large British NGOs generally put
limits on how much funding they receive from one donor or even all donors and
invest significant efforts in raising funds from the general public. This helps to limit
donor influence on their policies at the strategic level. However, it may also mean
that no external stakeholder has strong accountability powers over such NGOs.
In reviewing proposals and actual performance, almost all donors do give
significant weight to whether the agency has involved communities in the needs
assessments, project implementation, and project evaluation phases. Donor staff and
evaluators usually obtain feedback from communities during field visits about their
satisfaction with the project design and implementation. However, the actual level
of emphasis is generally at the discretion of individual staff members (low
formality). In addition, donor reporting requirement rigidities reduce program
effectiveness and divert attention away from community realities and requirements
(ACCA 2009; Ebrahim 2003a). The main incentive for donors in funding projects in
developing countries is enhancing positive donor visibility. Thus, the donor’s main
focus in accountability, as with boards, is on avoiding major problems in projects
funded by it rather than encouraging excellence in services to communities.
Host Government-Managed NGO Accountability Processes
The main accountability process employed by host governments is the NGO
legislation, registration, and subsequent reporting process. There has been a
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significant increase in the number of host countries adopting strict processes for the
accountability of NGOs as the level of advocacy and funding of NGOs has
increased. The governmental attitude in developing NGO legislation ranges from a
strong desire for control to apathy, depending on whether relationships with NGOs
are cordial or tense (Mayhew 2005). The legislation normally describes the behavior
expected of NGOs in running operations, designing projects and regular reporting.
With respect to sanctioning, governments usually attempt to control NGO behavior
through delays in or refusals of project approvals, work visas for expatriates, and
travel and import permits, and in rare cases, governments can even expel NGOs. As
in the case of donors, the level of scrutiny experienced by NGOs depends on the
strength of the monitoring mechanisms adopted by different governments. Only in
rare cases do governments undertake independent evaluations of NGO activities.
Overall, the strength of host governments’ accountability over NGOs is high as they
participate in all three phases of NGO accountability at the functional level with
high influence, frequency and formality, and medium span, level of scrutiny, and
concentration of powers. Rarely is there any strong emphasis in host government-
led NGO accountability processes on ensuring community participation and
accountability as the main focus of host governments is reducing the criticism
and competition from NGOs.
NGO Staff Managed Accountability Processes
The most common process for setting standards and measuring performance for
projects and activities at the functional level are NGO-managed needs assessments,
project evaluations and audits. However, the quality of these assessments and
evaluations vary significantly, especially the latter since there is a strong bias for
reporting positive results among all stakeholders even when the evaluations are
done by NGO-recruited external stakeholders. NGO staff members prefer positive
evaluations to impress internal and external stakeholders, communities are reluctant
to make overly critical remarks and risk losing NGO project support and external
evaluators have an interest in maintaining good relationships so that they get work
in future (Wenar 2006). Major meta-studies of NGO effectiveness have found
achievements but also major problems with the quality of NGO evaluation
processes, especially about the use of vague objectives, the lack of baseline data and
the poor quality of outcomes data collected that make it difficult to evaluate the
impact of NGOs (Evison 1999; Riddell et al. 1997; Oakley 1999). These problems
are magnified by the problems associated with the criteria and data collection tools
used in the development sector, as explained below.
NGOs generally collect community perceptions during the needs assessments,
proposal design, and project evaluation stages. However, community participation
in such processes is generally through group meetings or individual interviews
where decision-making power is retained by project staff—a process referred to as
‘‘sham ritual’’ or feel-good exercises for both participants and NGOs by Najam
(1996). Ebrahim (2003b) argues that for true accountability, it is crucial that
communities are able to negotiate and bargain over decisions or even hold veto
powers. Such powers are not afforded even under highly participatory exercises,
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such as social audits and Participatory Rural Appraisals. Thus, given the fact that
NGO-managed processes are frequently the main sources of information for the
accountability processes managed by other stakeholders, NGOs enjoy a very high
degree of control over their own accountability processes. Where donors and
governments play a more active role, NGOs do get exposed to more external
scrutiny. However, that greater scrutiny may not necessarily lead to improvements
in quality of services to communities depending on the basic motivation of the
external stakeholder.
Issues with the Performance Criteria and the Tools
NGO accountability is also complicated by the fact that NGOs do not have a simple
bottom-line, such as annual profits in the case of corporations (Gray et al. 2006).
While a number of criteria have been developed for measuring NGO performance
(listed in the last section), most of them relate not to strategic-level agency
performance but to performance of individual NGO projects (functional level
accountability). These is little attempt or easy techniques available to integrate the
individual functional performance analysis into overall strategic level performance
analysis. In addition, each of the functional level criteria is complex and difficult to
measure, and requires a wide range of information covering demographic, financial,
economic political, cultural, physical, psychological, and environmental areas. This
requires the use of several of the tools mentioned above, many of which are time-
consuming and expensive to use, and have variable validity and reliability,
especially since NGO projects usually takes place in isolated areas lacking good
communication and logistics facilities. Some NGO activities and their impact are
easier to measure, especially those involving delivery of discrete materials, such as
food, water, and shelter. However, others are more difficult to track and measure,
such as capacity-building and advocacy activities (Davies 2002). Furthermore, there
is very little investment in standardization of these criteria their measurement or of
the specific data collection tools. Nor do current NGO record-keeping patterns allow
the easy measurement and comparison of these criteria across time, territory, and
agencies. These issues with the performance criteria and tools reduce the scrutiny
capacities of all stakeholders.
The analysis above reveals an interesting picture about the nature of NGO
accountability. At the strategic level, the strongest accountability is to boards and
the weakest accountability to NGO bodies, with home governments falling in
between. At the functional level, donors and host governments possess high and
medium strength accountability, respectively, staff and partners possess medium
strength accountability while communities have weak accountability. In addition,
stakeholders that possess a high degree of strategic-level accountability over NGOs
generally exercise low levels of scrutiny. Donors and host governments generally
employ higher levels of scrutiny but exercise accountability mainly at the functional
level. Thus, even though boards exercise the strongest accountability powers over
NGOs this power is diluted in practice by the low level of scrutiny exercised usually
by them. As such, no stakeholder scores high across the board on all the criteria
presented above.
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The two stakeholders with the weakest accountability powers are peers and
communities. In particular, communities exercise the lowest level of accountability
among all stakeholders even in the case of the most community-oriented NGOs
despite strong rhetoric to the contrary (Kilby 2006; Mulgan 2003; Najam 1996;
Salamon et al. 2000). In fact, even the common use by NGOs of the term
‘‘downward accountability’’ to refer to accountability to communities aptly
describes where in the hierarchy communities fall for NGOs. Communities possess
high scrutiny capacities based on personal exposure but generally participate only in
the first two phases (no involvement in the sanctioning process) of functional
accountability processes with low influence, formality, span, and concentration of
authority and medium frequency. Unlike other stakeholders, they do not manage a
formal NGO accountability process and their participation is through the formal
processes managed by other stakeholders and at the latter’s discretion. These
stakeholders generally focus on avoiding extremely poor services to communities
rather than on encouraging excellence in program quality. Not surprisingly, several
studies have questioned the quality of NGO programs (Evison 1999; Riddell et al.
1997; Oakley 1999). As such, current processes focus on the first four purposes of
accountability and do not help in converting acceptable performance into excellence
and in ensuring greater justice in the global economy and polity.
However, if accountability is to live up to its real purpose, i.e., improving justice
in the use of the world’s power and resources, then it is crucial that NGOs
purposefully strengthen their ‘‘downward’’ accountability in order to convert
acceptable performance into excellence and to ensure greater justice in the global
economy and polity. In addition, the stakeholders who frequently criticize NGOs
base it (at least overtly even though the real motivations may be self-serving)
mainly on the supposed lack of representativeness and accountability of NGOs to
communities and their own supposed accountability or at least high degree of
concern for communities. Thus, NGOs can simultaneously improve their perform-
ance and protect themselves better against politically motivated accountability calls
by voluntarily developing processes that foster strong and genuine accountability to
communities and gaining wide-spread acceptance for such processes among all
stakeholders, including donors and governments. This wide-spread acceptance can
best be gained by developing these processes collectively with peers in NGO
coordination bodies, such as HAP, ALNAP and Interaction, rather than individually.
A large number of peer-managed accreditation processes were identified earlier
which generally participate in all three phases of NGO strategic accountability with
high influence, medium frequency, concentration authority and span, and low
formality and scrutiny capacity. The effectiveness of these mechanisms can be
enhanced by increasing their: (1) frequency, span and formality of involvement (2)
concentration authority, (3) scrutiny capacities, and (4) reach to the functional level.
These attributes can be enhanced by increasing coordination among different peer
mechanisms, getting a larger number of donors, home-governments and NGOs on-
board and through the development of standardized and more easily measurable
performance criteria and valid, reliable and cost-effective data collection tools.
NGO accountability mechanisms must also ensure high community accountability
over NGOs by increasing the frequency, formality, influence, span, concentration of
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authority, and scrutiny powers of community involvement in all three phases of
NGO accountability at both the strategic and functional levels. For example, this
can be done by helping community-based organizations to federate at the regional
and national levels and having their representatives participate in NGO account-
ability and project evaluation processes, and, where feasible, even having them on
NGO boards. Thus, paradoxically, by enhancing the accountability powers of its
two weakest stakeholders, NGOs can protect themselves against politically
motivated pressures from more powerful stakeholders.
Conclusions
This article has provided a comprehensive framework for developing a better
understanding of the concept of NGO accountability and its various dimensions.
The analysis has clearly shown that, despite the rhetoric to the contrary, NGO
accountability is weakest to the communities and strongest to the board and donors.
This situation has provided the opportunity to politically motivated parties to
question the legitimacy and integrity of NGOs. At the same time, research by well-
intentioned parties has also shown significant problems with the program evaluation
processes employed by NGOs. Thus, there is a need to seriously reconsider current
approaches to NGO accountability that lack rigor, quality, objectivity, and
cohesiveness and do not help much in achieving the two most important purposes
of accountability: converting acceptable performance into excellence and ensuring
greater justice in the global economy and polity.
The article has essentially argued for strengthening the accountability of NGOs to
communities through coordinated accreditation programs managed by NGO
coordinating bodies with the active support of donors, home governments, and
other stakeholders. Clearly, this will involve greater external intrusion into the
operations of NGOs. However, as agencies fighting for transparency in society,
NGOs should embrace such intrusion in their own affairs whole-heartedly given that
the process outlined here empowers those two stakeholders most that NGOs have
the least to be suspicious about. Only by doing so would NGOs follow Chambers’
inspiring call to put the last first.
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